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CITY OF LAFAYETTE, LOUISIANA v. LOUISIANA
POWER & LIGHT CO.: WILL MUNICIPAL ANTITRUST
LIABILITY DOOM EFFECTIVE STATE-LOCAL
GOVERNMENT RELATIONS?
The scope of the state action doctrine is one of the least clearly deline-
ated areas of federal antitrust law. The Supreme Court first applied the
doctrine in Parker v. Brown' which upheld the California Prorate Market-
ing Act 2 against a claim that the operation of the statute gave rise to
violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.3 Reviewing the language
and legislative history of the Sherman Act, the Court held that the Act was
riot intended to constrain the regulatory acts of state government.' Subse-
quent application of the doctrine has been confusing because courts have
been unable to agree on when antitrust defendants, other than states which
are engaged in anticompetitive activity, may claim antitrust immunity
under Parker. Some courts have required defendants to show that the
conduct was undertaken pursuant to a state's legislative mandate. Other
courts have extended Parker immunity to defendants other than states
without requiring a legislative mandate, provided the defendant was a
political subdivision or other agency of the state.5 Where a mandate has
1 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The Parker doctrine is often referred to as an exemption from
federal antitrust laws. See Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown State Action
Doctrine, 76 CoLum. L. REv. 1, 9 n.44 (1976). The term "exemption", while convenient, does
not properly describe the doctrine. Action taken by a state legislature is more precisely not
within the scope of the antitrust laws.
The state action doctrine has its origins in Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 345 (1904) and
Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908, 911 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895). In Olsen, the state had enacted a
statute that allowed only persons who held state issued licenses to engage in the pilotage
profession. Lowenstein upheld a South Carolina statute which pievented private parties from
selling distilled spirits. Since the state in both cases rightfully exercised its power to regulate
local trade, no monopoly or restraint of trade arose from the fact that only the state's author-
ized agents were engaged in the challenged activities. 195 U.S. at 345.
1 The California Agricultural Prorate Act, ch. 754, 1933 Cal. Stats. 1969 (current version
at CAL. AGmc. CODE §§ 59501-60015 (West 1967)) authorized state officials to stabilize the
prices of agricultural commodities produced in the state by establishing marketing programs
which restricted competition among growers. In Parker, a raisin grower and packer had
contracted to sell most of his 1940 crop before the program in question was adopted. 317 U.S.
at 349. The program as adopted required raisin growers to pool a large part of their crop and
allow a program committee, selected by the State Director of Agriculture, to control the
classification and distribution of the raisins. Id. at 346-48. Brown alleged that if the program
was enforced against him he would be prevented from marketing his 1940 crop and fulfilling
contracts which he had already negotiated. Id. at 349.
317 U.S. at 350. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) makes illegal all contracts, combinations and
conspiracies in restraint of interstate trade or commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) makes it a
felony to monopolize or endeavor to monopolize any aspect of interstate or foreign trade or
commerce.
317 U.S. at 350-51.
Subsequent to the Parker decision, some courts held that state agencies need not show
a legislative mandate for their conduct in order to claim state action immunity. Saenz v.
University Interscholastic League, 487 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973) involved allegedly anticom-
petitive activity undertaken by an agency of the state of Texas. Id. at 1028. The court held
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been required, inconsistent standards for establishing its existence have
been applied by different courts.' In City of Lafayette, Louisiana v. Louis-
that the League's status as a state agency automatically afforded it antitrust immunity under
the Parker doctrine. Id. See also E. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth.,
362 F.2d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1967). Other courts applying the
Parker doctrine to the conduct of state agents have required that the defendants show state
involvement in the activity before extending antitrust immunity to the agency. In Ladue
Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1970), two states had
monopolized bus transportation service through Bi-State, their common agency. Id. at 132.
The fact that Bi-State's activities were engaged in pursuant to powers granted by the states
made the Sherman Act inapplicable. Id. See also Hecht v. Pro Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931
(D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972). In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773 (1975), the Supreme Court applied the Parker doctrine in an antitrust suit against
a state agency and adopted the state mandate requirement. Id. at 790; see text accompanying
note 30 infra.
Two circuit court cases subsequent to Goldfarb have applied the Parker doctrine to state
political subdivisions engaged in allegedly anticompetitive conduct. Duke & Co. v. Foerster,
521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975) involved a suit by a manufacturer and seller of malt beverages
alleging a conspiracy between three municipal corporations, a county commissioner and three
private corporations to boycott the use of his goods in the municipal facilities they operated.
Id. at 1278. The court held that the defendants had to demonstrate a mandate whereby the
state intended to compel a restraint on competition in the area of the market they occupied.
Id. at 1280-81. Nothing explicit or implied in the defendant's powers compelled the boycott,
thus the defendants were not protected under Parker.
In Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted,
vacated, 435 U.S. 992 (1978), the defendant District was a unit of local government under
the state constitution. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 1. Pursuant to its statutory powers the District
operated several golf courses and granted concessions to operate a pro shop at each course.
557 F.2d at 585. The concessions were terminated and granted to a private corporation
precipitating the plaintiffs' allegations of antitrust violations. Id. at 585. Relying on Goldfarb,
the court held that a legislative mandate showing state compulsion of the challenged activity
was necessary in order for subordinate governmental units to be protected under Parker. Id.
at 589-90. The absence of specific statutory language directing the defendants to engage in
the challenged conduct and the District's limited revenue raising powers made state action
immunity inappropriate. Id. at 590-91. Significantly, the plaintiffs also alleged that the
District's conduct had resulted in a hidden sales tax illegal under Illinois law. Id. at 591. The
court would not imply state direction of activity which was illegal under state law. Id.
Private defendants seeking state action immunity have generally been required to show
a legislative mandate for their anticompetitive activity. See, e.g., Cantor v. Detroit Edison
Co., 428 U.S. 579, 600 (1976). Cantor raised the issue of whether state approval of the utility's
tariff which included a plan to replace its customer's lightbulbs without additional cost made
the plan state action and thus immune from the Sherman Act. The Court held that state
approval was not a state mandate. Id. at 585; see text accompanying note 67 infra.
I Judicial confusion regarding the proper application of the mandate requirement pre-
vailed in cases involving both private and governmental antitrust defendants. Prior to Cantor
private antitrust defendants were sometimes required to meet a less strict test for a state
mandate of their conduct than the Cantor Court enunciated in order to claim state action
immunity. In Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1062 (1972), the defendant, an electric utility company, employed allegedly anticom-
petitive rate scales. Id. at 1137. The court held that the Georgia Public Service Commission's
consideration and approval of the rate scales constituted a sufficient state mandate to immu-
nize the defendant from the antitrust laws under the Parker doctrine. Id. at 1140. See also
Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248, 252 (4th Cir. 1971)
(holding that the State Corporation Commission's silence on the validity of certain rate
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iana Power & Light Co.,7 a divided Supreme Court8 reaffirmed the legisla-
tive mandate requirement for municipalities seeking Parker immunity but
the Court left unclear the standard by which the mandate must be estab-
lished. 0
In City of Lafayette, the cities of Lafayette and Plaquemine, Louisiana
sued the Louisiana Power & Light Co. (LP&L), LP&L's parent company,
and two other power companies for alleged antitrust violations." LP&L
schedules implied approval by the state resulting in a valid state action defense). In Conti-
nental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962), the Supreme Court
rejected the defendant's contention that they were exempt from the antitrust laws because
one of Union Carbide's subsidiaries, a named defendant, had acted as the sole purchasing
agent for the Canadian government. Id. at 703 & 706-07. The Court required the defendants
to show that Canadian laws had compelled the subsidiary's actions before recognizing a valid
defense to antitrust liability under Parker. Id. at 707. Continental Ore illustrates the Court's
uncertainty regarding the proper test for a state action mandate. While Canadian laws were
found not to compel the defendant's conduct, the Court also noted that Canadian authorities
had neither approved nor directed the challenged act. Id. at 706. The implication is that
governmental approval or direction would have sufficed to show a mandate absent a compel-
ling statute. See text accompanying note 67 infra.
In Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1970), the
court held that a state's authorization of its agent's activity was an adequate mandate to
invoke Parker immunity. Id. at 133-135. After Goldfarb, however, courts have applied a strict
standard which governmental subunits must meet to establish the existence of the state
mandate. See Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3rd Cir. 1975), and Kurek v. Pleasure
Driveway & Park Dist., 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, vacated, 435 U.S. 992
(1978).
435 U.S. 389 (1978).
Id. at 390. The division of the Justices indicates the unsettled state of the Parker
doctrine. A majority agreed on the necessity for a legislative mandate of municipal anticom-
petitive conduct before invoking the doctrine but split on the issue of what standard the
mandate must meet. Compare 435 U.S. at 408-17 (plurality opinion) with 435 U.S. at 318-26
(Burger, C.J. concurring). Justice Stewart, joined by Justices White, Blackmun, and Rehn-
quist dissented. 435 U.S. at 426-41. See text accompanying notes 37-88 infra.
I Both the plurality and the dissent in City of Lafayette referred to the petitioner cities
as political subdivisions of the state. 435 U.S. at 408, 428. Political subdivisions have been
defined as entities that exist to discharge local governmental functions within a prescribed
area through locally elected officials. McClanahan v. Cochise College, 25 Ariz. App. 13, 540
P.2d 744 (1975), Dugas v. Beauregard, 155 Conn. 573, 236 A.2d 87 (1967). In the past, the
Court has classified cities as political subdivisions of the state. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 575, rehearing denied, 379 U.S. 870 (1964). An alternative analysis characterizes cities
as political subdivisions based on the nature of the functions they perform. See 1 E. McQuIL-
LAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORAVONS § 209 (3d ed., 1971 rev. volume). [hereinafter cited as E.
McQuiLL1. In its public or governmental capacity a city is a political subdivision of the
state; in its private or proprietary capacity it is not. Id. Two factors help determine whether
a function is public or private. Activities undertaken for the state's benefit are public and
those performed for the locality's benefit are private. Functions of a business nature which
are also performed by private persons or corporations are private. Under McQuillan's analysis
municipal ownership of public utilities presents special problems because both the state and
the locality are benefited thereby. 12 E. McQUI'IJ , MUNICIPAL CORPOATIONS § 35.04 (3d ed.,
1970 rev. volume).
11 Before the district court could apply the Supreme Court's decision on remand, the
parties in City of Lafayette settled out of court.
1 435 U.S. at 392. The cities alleged that the defendants conspired to restrain trade and
attempted to monopolize the generation, transmission and distribution of electric power
1979]
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counterclaimed and alleged that the cities had violated the Sherman Act"
by the manner in which they operated their public utility systems.13 The
cities successfully moved in the district court to dismiss the counterclaim
arguing that the Parker doctrine exempted cities from Sherman Act cover-
age." On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded on the issue of
whether a state legislative mandate existed for the cities' anticompetitive
conduct. 5 The Supreme Court granted the cities' petition for certiorari'6
on the issue of whether municipalities, as political subdivisions of the
states, may avail themselves of the Parker doctrine to avoid federal anti-
trust liability. 7
Implicit in the cities' contention that the Parker doctrine affords mu-
nicipalities antitrust immunity was the argument that the Sherman Act
was not intended to operate against local governments. Only Justice Bren-
nan's rejection of this argument commanded a majority of the Court.'
Justice Brennan relied on Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, '1
which held that cities are persons within the general definitional section
of the Sherman Act."0 The Court also rejected two policy arguments ad-
vanced by the cities to justify an implied municipal exemption from the
Act.2' The petitioners argued that to subject cities to the severe civil and
causing injury to the cities in the operation of their utility systems. Id. Specifically the cities
charged that the defendants had improperly refused to wheel power, withheld supplies from
their own markets, undertaken boycotts against the cities and commenced sham litigation
to prevent the cities from financing the construction of municipal power generating facilities.
Id. at n.5. The cities were empowered by state statute to own and operate public utilities
within and beyond their city limits. LA. Ray. STAT. ANN. §§ 33:1326, :4162, :4163 (West 1950).
12 435 U.S. at 392; see text accompanying note 3 supra.
11 435 U.S. at 392 n.6. The defendant's counterclaim alleged conspiracies between peti-
tioners to engage in sham litigation against LP&L in order to prevent the construction of a
nuclear power plant by the defendants, to eliminate competition within city limits through
covenants in their debentures, to limit competition through long term supply contracts, and
to displace LP&L in the market through tying arrangements. Under the tying arrangements
LP&L's customers had to purchase their electricity from the cities in order to retain their
water and gas service. Id.
" Id. at 392.
'5 532 F.2d 431, 434-35 (5th Cir. 1976); see text accompanying notes 27-36 infra.
S 430 U.S. 944 (1977).
435 U.S. at 391.
Joining Justice Brennan in the first part of his opinion were Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Marshall, Powell and Stevens. The Chief Justice did not join in parts TI and III of
the plurality opinion and filed a separate concurring opinion. See notes 36 & 63 infra.
11 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
2 435 U.S. at 396. The Sherman Act defines persons in 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1976). It defines
"person" to include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by state,
federal, territorial or foreign laws. The question in Chattanooga Foundry was whether a
municipality had standing as a "person" to bring suit under § 7 of the Sherman Act. Ch.
647, 26 Stat. 210 (1890) (repealed 1955). Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976),
presently permits suits only by "persons" injured by antitrust law violations. Antitrust laws,
as defined by § 1 of the Clayton Act, include the Sherman Act. Id. at § 12. While the city of
Atlanta was the plaintiff in Chattanooga Foundry, the cities in City of Lafayette were before
the Supreme Court as defendants to LP&L's counterclaim. See text accompanying note 13
supra.
11 435 U.S. at 399-407. Aside from the Parker doctrine, the Court recognized that the
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criminal sanctions of the Act would be improper.2 Without holding that
the Act's sanctions are applicable to municipal.defendants,2 the Court
said such a holding would not be improper in light of other federal laws
which subject cities to various statutory sanctions. 2 In response to the
cities' second contention, that the Act was intended to apply only to pri-
vate abuses of power, the Court emphasized. that the goal of the cities'
operation of public utilities was at least partly private profit.2s The Court
equated the cities with private enterprises since the efforts of both to
maximize profits through anticompetitive conduct can result in the con-
travention of national antitrust policy.
28
After refusing to imply a blanket exemption from Sherman Act cover-
age for local governments, Justice Brennan addressed the applicability of
principles at issue in Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127 (1961) justify an implied exclusion from antitrust laws. 435 U.S. at 399. Noerr
involved a claim by Pennsylvania truck operators that 24 eastern railroads violated §§ 1 and
2 of the Sherman Act by hiring a public relations firm to campaign against Pennsylvania
truckers. The campaign was designed to secure the retention and adoption of state laws and
enforcement practices detrimental to the trucking business, to incite public distaste for the
industry, and to damage the relations between the truckers and their customers. 365 U.S. at
129. The Supreme Court held that the alleged activities did not violate the Sherman Act
because they were attempts to influence the passage of legislation. Id. at 135, 140-43. The
Court stated that the defendant's first amendment right to petition the government would
be infringed by extending antitrust liability to the challenged conduct. Id. at 137.
22 435 U.S. at 400.
= Id. at 402-03 n.22. The majority did not decide whether treble damage liability was
the proper remedy in an antitrust suit against municipalities because the district court had
not determined the petitioners in City of Lafayette had violated the antitrust laws. See text
accompanying notes 73, 132-35 infra.
24 435 U.S. a 401-02 nn.19-21. The Court cited three federal statutes under which cities
or states may be held liable for financial penalties as "persons" within the statutory defini-
tions: 49 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1976) (persons giving or receiving rebates respecting interstate
transportation of property are subject to maximum penalty of $20,000); see Union Pac. R. R.
Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450, 463 (1941) (cities are included within the term "persons"
in § 41); Shipping Act of 1916, §§ 16-17, 39 Stat. 734 (1916) (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§
815-816 (1970) (amended 1972)) (making certain discriminatory acts unlawful and punishable
by a $5,000 fine); see California v. United States, 320 U.S. 544, 585 (1944) (the Shipping Act
applies to states and municipalities); Rev. Stat. §§ 3244, 3140 (1878) (imposing a $25 to $100
tax on "persons" selling alcoholic beverages); see Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 370 (1934)
(states qualified as "persons" under § 3140).
21 435 U.S. at 403-05.
21 Id. at 406-08. Petitioners argued that their conduct would naturally enhance the public
welfare because the electorate ultimately controlled their policy decisions. The Court rejected
the argument noting that non-city residents would have to purchase power from the cities if
LP&L was displaced by the cities' conduct. Those new customers would be unable to influ-
ence municipal conduct through the cities' political processes. Id. at 406. Also, the fact that
LP&L's parent company is a Florida corporation greatly impaired its ability to influence the
cities' policies through the state legislature. Id. The Court stated that the cities' argument
was overly broad since it could also justify non-enforcement of the antitrust laws against
private parties. Persons injured by anticompetitive activity would always have alternative
recourse through the political process. Id. at 406-07. Moreover, even if local welfare was served
by the cities' actions, an implied antitrust exemption was not warranted since local interests
would not necessarily comport with the national policy of economic competition embodied
in the Sherman Act. Id. at 408.
1979]
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the Parker doctrine to the cities' activities.27 A majority of the Court held
that the cities were exempt from the antitrust laws under the Parker doc-
trine only if they could show a state legislative mandate for their activity 2
Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, read Parker as exempting only
those activities directed by the state, as sovereign, through its legislature.
2
1
Relying on the Court's application of the Parker doctrine in previous deci-
sions,30 the plurality stated that the underlying premise of Parker's holding
was that the principle of federalism 3' prevents the Court from inferring a
congressional intent to subject state governmental acts to the application
of the antitrust laws.32 According to the pluraility, the Parker doctrine
should not automatically extend to municipal activities because cities are
2 Id. at 408-13.
" See note 8 supra. While agreeing that an implied antitrust exemption for the cities was
not warranted and that Parker immunity was not automatic the five majority Justices did
not agree under what circumstances cities would have state action immunity. See text accom-
panying notes 33-36 infra.
435 U.S. at 409.
Id. at 411-12. The Court reviewed its earlier decisions in Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) and Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977). In Goldfarb
the Court enunciated a legislative mandate test to be applied to state administrative agencies
claiming antitrust immunity under Parker. The State Bar Association had issued ethical
opinions supporting local fee schedules in its capacity as a state agency for the administration
of the legal profession. 421 U.S. at 776, 777 nn.4 & 5; see text accompanying note 5 supra.
The Court held that in order for the Association's conduct to be protected by the state action
exemption the state must have "directed" the use of fee schedules or "required" the price
floor the schedules produced. 421 U.S. at 790. Since the state, through the State Supreme
Court, had promulgated ethical codes directing lawyers not to be controlled by fee schedules,
the Bar Association's ethical opinions, which had promoted adherence to local schedules,
were not state action. Id. at 789-90. The local Bar Association which had published the
minimum fee schedules at issue in Goldfarb was also required to show a state mandate for
its conduct. The fact that the fee schedules may have been "prompted" by the State Bar's
ethical opinions was held not to justify invoking the Parker doctrine. Instead, the schedules
had to be compelled by the state's direction to be exempt from the Sherman Act. Id. at 791.
The defendants in Bates unsuccessfully attacked, on antitrust grounds, the ban on attor-
ney advertising imposed by the Arizona Supreme Court as the state body regulating the
practice of law in Arizona. 433 U.S. at 359. The State Bar Association's enforcement of the
ban was not an antitrust violation because the advertising was prohibited by State Supreme
Court Rule 29(a) and was therefore an expression of state policy articulated by the state's
authority. Id.
In City of Lafayette the majority used Goldfarb and Bates to illustrate the need for a
legislative mandate before invoking the Parker doctrine when the state itself is not a defen-
dant. See text accompanying note 32 infra. The dissent, however, contended that Goldfarb
was factually distinguishable from City of Lafayette. See text accompanying notes 54-63
infra.
3, A federal system contemplates a general government of delegated powers which coex-
ists with other levels of government with regional jurisdiction. The tenth amendment to the
United States Constitution embodies the principle of federalism, reserving to the states or
the people those powers not delegated to the national government. The states' existence is
guaranteed against infringement by protection of their ability to exercise their reserved pow-
ers. See generally G. DmEzE, THE FEDERALIST: A CLASSIC ON FEDERALISM AND FREE GovERNmENT
(1960); THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (J. Madison).
= 435 U.S. at 411-12.
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not accorded the same level of federal deference as are states.?
While withholding automatic antitrust immunity from the cities, the
plurality recognized that local, governmental actions might reflect state
policy and therefore be protected under the Parker doctrine. Justice Bren-
nan said state authorization or direction34 of the challenged activity is
required in order to assure that it reflects state policy and is therefore state
action." The plurality, agreeing with the Fifth -Circuit, explained that a
state mandate of a local activity exists if it can be shown, from the author-
ity granted to a municipality, that the state legislature contemplated the
kind of activity engaged in by the locality. 6
The dissent in City of Lafayette, authored by Justice Stewart, focused
on three issues raised by the Court's interpretation and application of the
Parker doctrine. First, the dissent criticized the majority for improperly
limiting the scope of the state action doctrine.? Justice Stewart also dis-
cussed the adverse effects of the legislative mandate requirement in gen-
eral, focusing particularly on the ambiguity of the tests proposed by the
plurality and concurring Justices for establishing the existence of a proper
mandate." The dissenters finally addressed the possible deleterious finan-
cial effects of subjecting local governments to treble damage liability. 9
Jutice Stewart began his criticism of the majority's interpretation of
the state action doctrine by stating that the holding in Parker was based
on the Court's understanding of the congressional purpose behind the
Sherman Act. The dissenters contended, on the basis of the legislative
3 Id. at 412. The plurality placed particular emphasis on the fact that political subdivi-
sions of the state are not accorded immunity from suit under the eleventh amendment. See
text accompanying notes 45-47 infra.
3 435 U.S. at 414. By using the term "authorization", Justice Brennan appeared to be
adopting a less stringent test for a legislative mandate than the Court adopted in Cantor.
See text accompanying notes 5 supra & 67 infra.
435 U.S. at 414.
' Id. at 415. Unlike the plurality, Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion stated that
the dispositive factor in City of Lafayette should have been the proprietary nature of the
cities' activities. The Chief Justice used the term proprietary to emphasize that both the
parties challenging the cities' conduct and the cities were engaged in economic competition
to which the federal antitrust laws should apply. Id. at 422 n.3. Burger supported the appro-
priateness of his distinction between proprietary and governmental activities with specific
instances where the Court had distinguished between a state's private and sovereign capaci-
ties in upholding federal regulation of state conduct under the commerce and taxing powers.
Id. at 422. Relying on the cities' allegations of inability to expand their businesses, lost profits,
and diminished business value, the Chief Justice said the cities' operation of utilities was a
proprietary function. Id. at 419. Like the plurality, he would therefore require the cities to
show a legislative mandate for anticompetitive activity before invoking Parker but also pro-
posed a two part test to measure the sufficiency of the mandate. First, the state, as sovereign,
must have required the activity and second, the city would be protected only if an antitrust
exemption was absolutely necessary in order to effectuate the state's regulatory policy. Id. at
425-26.
435 U.S. at 408-13, 428-34; see text accompanying notes 27-33 supra.
31 435 U.S. at 414, 434-40; see text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
31 435 U.S. at 440. In a separate dissenting opinion Justice Blackmun also addressed the
issue of damages. Id. at 442; see note 88 infra.
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history of the Act, that the purpose of federal antitrust law is to eliminate
private concentrations of economic power which tend to be unresponsive
to public needs.40 Since Congress was concerned with private and not gov-
ernmental economic power, the dissenters concluded that the dispositive
factor in Parker was that the administration of the Agricultural Prorate
Act had been a governmental and not private activity.4' According to Jus-
tice Stewart, the Parker exemption was not limited to the activities of a
state, as opposed to local governmental activity.2 The test the dissent in
City of Lafayette advocated to determine whether a challenged activity
was governmental or private focused on the nature of the party engaged
in the activity. Justice Stewart reasoned that because cities are state in-
strumentalities administering local government, and are controlled by
their residents through local elections and state legislatures, they are gov-
ernmental bodies whose activities fall within the Parker doctrine.
43
Since the plurality's reading of Parker differed substantially from the
dissent's,44 Justice Stewart addressed the two reasons advanced by the
plurality as precluding the automatic extension of state action immunity
to local governments. 45 The plurality reasoned that judicial reluctance to
equate states and localities under the eleventh amendment supported a
distinction between cities and states in applying the Parker doctrine. In
10 435 U.S. at 428.
11 Id. at 428-29; see text accompanying note 2 supra.
11 435 U.S. at 429.
43 Id. at 429-30.
" See text accompanying notes 27-33 supra.
41 435 U.S. at 430; see text accompanying notes 30-33 supra.
46 435 U.S. at 412. The proposal and ratification of the eleventh amendment was a
reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793),
and was designed to prevent future application of the case. See generally C. JACOBS, THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMuNrrY (1975). In Chisolm the Court held that indi-
vidual citizens of a state could sue another state in federal court without the defendant state's
permission. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 428. Article ll of the Constitution extended the federal judicial
power to controversies between a state and a citizeri of another state. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, §
2, cl. 1. Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 had vested original jurisdiction in the Supreme
Court over cases to which a state was a party. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. XX, 513, 1 Stat. 73,
80 (1789). Since neither the Constitution nor the Judiciary Act had made a jurisdictional
exception for cases where a state was the defendant instead of the plaintiff, the Court held
that by ratifying the Constitution the states had agreed to-subject themselves to involuntary
suits in federal court. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 420-21. Fear that states would be subjected to undue
control by the federal judiciary prompted the eleventh amendment. The amendment states
that federal jurisdiction will not exist in suits against the states by non-residents. U.S. CONST.
amend. XI. See generally Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. COLO. L.
REV. 139 (1977). In Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890), the Court refused to extend
the eleventh amendment's protection to political subdivisions of the states since unlike states,
they are not sovereign entities. Id. at 530. Whether the plurality's analogy in City of Lafayette
between the state action doctrine and the eleventh amendment is valid, however, may be
disputed since some question exists as to whether the eleventh amendment reflects principles
of federalism, as the Court maintains the Parker decision does, or respect for the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. Compare C. JACOBS, supra at 3-26 with Baker, supra at 172. If the
eleventh amendment is purely an expression of sovereign immunity, then the conflicting
interests it balances are governmental sovereignty and citizens' legal remedies, not federal
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response, Justice Stewart stated that the Court's focus on constitutional
principles in resolving issues of statutory interpretation was improper.47
His contention stemmed from his belief that the Parker Court had inter-
preted the Sherman Act in light of the evils Congress intended to elimi-
nate, and had held that governmental economic power was not among
them. 8 The dissenters also argued that if constitutional analogies were to
be made in City of Lafayette, the appropriate constitutional provision was
the commerce clause. 9 In National League of Cities v. Usery,ss the Court
had equated states and their political subdivisions in holding that provi-
sions of the Fair Labor Standards Act had been impermissably extended
to both." Since both the Sherman Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act
were promulgated pursuant to the commerce clause," Justice Stewart
stated that National League of Cities supported the view that state and
local governments should be treated as equals under the Parker doctrine. 3
The dissent's rejection of the plurality's arguments for limiting Parker's
applicability, based on principles of federalism, was followed by an attack
on the plurality's reliance on Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar as a second
reason supporting a limited application of Parker. In Goldfarb, the Court
required a local bar association and the Virginia State Bar to demonstrate
a legislative mandate for certain anticompetitive activities in order to
establish immunity under the Parker doctrine." In City of Lafayette, the
plurality emphasized that the Court in Goldfarb had characterized the
State Bar as a state agency.5 Since a legislative mandate was a prerequis-
ite to a state action defense in Goldfarb,"8 the plurality57 in City of
Lafayette reasoned that a city, as an agent of the state, 8 had to meet the
same requirement. 9
Justice Stewart disagreed with the plurality's reading of the Goldfarb
decision. Although the Virginia State Bar, like a city, was labeled the
state's agent, the dissent distinguished the two bodies because the State
power and state sovereignty. Consequently, Lincoln County did not address the issue of
federal deference to the states' political subdivisions. The analogy used in City of Lafayette
is nevertheless arguably valid because under both the federalism and sovereign immunity
analyses the controlling issue is whether the party seeking to invoke the principles involved
is a sovereign entity.
"435 U.S. at 430.
a Id. at 429-30; see text accompanying notes 40-43 supra.
"Id. at 430; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
426 U.S. 833 (1976).
m See text accompanying notes 99-121 infra.
" Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209; Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 676, §§ 2-3, 52
Stat. 1060.
435 U.S. at 430.
See text accompanying note 30 supra.
435 U.S. at 409.
"421 U.S. at 790.
Although they proposed different standards for establishing a legislative mandate
which would afford the cities Parker immunity, the plurality and concurring Justices agreed
on the necessity of a state mandate. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
" See text accompanying note 9 supra.
" 435 U.S. at 415, 424-25.
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Bar is not a political subdivision of the state, 0 but rather a private state
agency. " The dissent read Parker as protecting governmental activities
from the purview of the Sherman Act and defined governmental activities
"as those performed by governmental bodies.2 Justice Stewart viewed the
activities of a private state agency as non-governmental and subject to the
Sherman Act absent a state mandate. The activities of a state's political
subdivisions, however, would be governmental. Under the dissent's analy-
sis it would not be inconsistent to require a legislative mandate for the
State Bar's activities while automatically extending Parker immunity to
a city's activities.2
The dissent's disagreement with the plurality over the proper applica-
tion of Parker focused on the propriety of requiring a legislative mandate
91 Id. at 431. Under the definition advanced by the dissent, the State Bar Association in
Goldfarb was not a political subdivision because it did not administer local government
through locally elected officials. See text accompanying note 43 supra. The State Bar Asso-
ciation would not be classified as a political subdivision under the functional analysis adopted
by McQuillan since his framework is limited to the classificaion of cities engaged in conduct
for the state's benefit. See 1 E. McQuiLLAN, supra note 9, at § 209.
'l 435 U.S. at 431.
62 Id.; see text accompanying notes 40.43 supra.
" 435 U.S. at 431-32. Justice Stewart also addressed the Chief Justice's contentions as
to the circumstances under which state action immunity should be extended to municipali-
ties. The Chief Justice distinguished municipal proprietary and public functions, allowing
automatic antitrust immunity under the Parker doctrine for cities acting in their public
capacity and requiring a legislative mandate for proprietary anticompetitive conduct. See
note 36 supra. The dissenters believed that Chief Justice Burger's analysis would result in
inconsistent applications of the Parker doctrine in what they said were two identical situa-
tions. A state might choose to regulate private economic activity or engage in the activity
itself through one of its political subdivisions. 435 U.S. at 432; see Donnem, Federal Antitrust
Laws Versus Anticompetitive State Regulation, 39 A.B.A. ANTRrusT L. J. 950, 951-56 (1969-
70); Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown,
69 Nw. U. L. REv. 71, 75-77 (1974). State regulation would not be proprietary conduct because
it would not put the state in a competitive relationship with private participants in the
regulated activity. See note 36 supra. Presumably, the regulating governmental body would
be afforded automatic Parker immunity. If the governmental body entered the marketplace
itself, it would have to show that its conduct was mandated even though the motivation for
and effect of the regulatory program would be the same as for state entrance into the market.
435 U.S. at 432. If a private party engaged in anticompetitive activity under the regulatory
program was the defendant claiming Parker immunity, it would still have to show a state
mandate to prevail. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison, Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
In addition to asserting the anomalous results of applying the Chief Justice's analysis,
the dissenters stated that the proprietary-public function distinction had not been made
either in the Sherman Act or in the Parker decision. 435 U.S. at 433. Justice Stewart reasoned
that the Court has failed to make this distinction because such a distinction is specious. He
cited a case in which the Court had rejected the argument that the Federal Torts Claim Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976), did not apply to uniquely governmental functions. 435 U.S. at 433,
citing Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). In refusing to distinguish
between uniquely private and governmental functions the Court in Indian Towing referred
to the distinction as a quagmire resulting in judicial chaos. 350 U.S. at 65. Instead, the
Indian Towing Court characterized governmental activities as not being partly private and
partly public. Id. at 67-68. According to the City of LaFayette dissent, the Chief Justice
illustrated the futility of drawing the governmental-proprietary distinction by describing
the distinction with several different terms. 435 U.S. at 433-34 n.12.
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for the cities' anticompetitive activities. Justice Stewart next criticized the
vague standard advanced by the Court for establishing the existence of a
proper mandate and the adverse effects resulting from its application. First
he argued that requiring a legislative mandate for a city's anticompetitive
acts would diminish the state's ability to delegate effectively its govern-
mental functions to its political subdivisions. 4 The dissenters believed
that the states' ability to delegate power would be impaired because of the
difficulty of determining whether a mandate exists under the plurality's
analysis." Justice Stewart stated that the plurality did not clearly indicate
whether a state's authorization would constitute a sufficient mandate or
whether- direction from the legislature was required.6 The different mean-
ings of these terms has been recognized in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.67
By using them interchangeably the plurality in City of Lafayette had
injected an element of uncertainty into state procedures for delegating
governmental powers. 8 As a result, the state interest in allowing its legisla-
ture to concentrate on state-wide matters, while local problems are ad-
dressed by local government bodies, would be sacrificed.
Applying either a state authorization or direction standard to establish
a legislative mandate, Justice Stewart further contended that the plurality
was unclear on how specific the mandate had to be. 9 The plurality stated
that a city need show only that the state legislature had contemplated the
kind of activity challenged." Giving the term kind a broad meaning, the
dissent noted that a Louisiana statute7 ' authorizing cities to file suits,
operate public utilities, and borrow money by issuing bonds was evidence
* 435 U.S. at 434-38.
Id. at 435; see text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
'4435 U.S. at 435. At one point in the plurality opinion Justice Brennan stated that in
order to gain antitrust immunity the cities had to show that the state had "commanded" their
actions or "imposed" restraints which the cities effectuated by their conduct. The cities could
prove the existence of this command with evidence that the state had "authorized" or
"directed" their actions. Id. at 414. The dissent took issue with the logical inconsistency of
proving that activities were "commanded" by showing that they had been "authorized." Id.
at 435; see text accompanying note 67 infra.
- 428 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1976). In Cantor the Court stated that antitrust immunity was
not created by a state authorizing, approving, encouraging, or participating in private anti-
competitive activities. Id. The key issue for the Court in Cantor was that in each of these
circumstances a private party engaged in the conduct had sufficient discretion not to under-
take the activity. Id. at 593. The Cantor Court believed that the mandate was adequate
grounds for invoking the Parker doctrine, only where the state's mandate "command[ed]"
the private party's conduct. Id. at 592. By allowing the City of Lafayette petitioners Parker
immunity for anticompetitive conduct "authorized" by the state, the plurality appeared to
establish a less stringent legislative mandate test for political subdivisions of the state to meet
than that which the Cantor Court had required private defendants to meet. See note 66 supra.
The plurality further confused the issue by saying not that state authorization would result
in antitrust immunity but that the state's authorization could-be used to prove that the state
had commanded the challenged municipal conduct. Id.
"435 U.S. at 438; see text accompanying notes 126-29 infra.
" 435 U.S. at 435-37.
7' Id. at 415 (emphasis added).
7' LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33:621 (West 1950).
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that the Louisiana legislature had contemplated the kind of activities with
which the cities were charged.7 1 Justice Stewart interpreted the Court's
remand of City of Lafayette as indicating that the plurality did not believe
the statutory authority in question was sufficient to afford the petitioners
state action immunity.73 The dissenters could not, therefore, discern the
level of specificity the Court would require short of a separate statute
compelling each activity undertakerbq the cities, an alternative which the
dissenters viewed as improperly dictating state policy-making proce-
dures .
74
The problem of deciding whether a state legislature contemplated a
challenged activity was exacerbated for Justice Stewart by the absence, in
most cases, of recorded legislative history for state statutes.7 The plurality
had stated that the wording of a state statute was not the only valuable
evidence of the enacting legislature's intentions.7 When the statutory lan-
guage is ambiguous and no legislative history exists, however, the issue of
legislative intent is resolved only by judicial guesswork. 77 The plurality, by
formulating a nebulous test for establishing a legislative mandate in areas
where means of discerning legislative intent are nonexistent, had enunci-
ated what Justice Stewart saw as an impractical standard for antitrust
defendants to meet.
Three of the four dissenting Justices78 contended that the Court's deci-
sion would lead to improper judicial control over the powers states can
delegate to their political subdivisions as well as the means by which those
delegations can be made. Justice Stewart stated that the vagueness of the
Court's legislative mandate test would result in less social and economic
innovation by local governments. A city would be less willing to undertake
7 435 U.S. at 435-36. Justice Stewart stated that the "kind" of activity complained of
in City of Lafayette could be discerned by characterizing the conduct alleged in LP&L's
counterclaim in more general terms. Id. at 436; see note 13 supra. Although LP&L alleged
that the cities had engaged in sham litigation, maintained a monopoly through debenture
covenants and long term supply contracts, and employed illegal tying arrangements, the
dissenters considered that "kind" of activity as no more than bringing lawsuits, issuing
bonds, and providing utility services, respectively. 435 U.S. at 435-36.
" 435 U.S. at 436. Contrary to Justice Stewart's understanding, the Court made no
finding that the Louisiana statute was insufficient evidence that Louisiana contemplated the
kind of activity challenged by LP&L. The Fifth Circuit had remanded City of Lafayette to
the district court with instructions to determine whether a sufficient mandate existed to
invoke the Parker doctrine. 532 F.2d at 434-35. The Supreme Court merely affirmed the Fifth
Circuit's decision to remand. 435 U.S. at 394, 415, 425.
1, 435 U.S. at 438.
11 Id.; see G. FOLSOM, LEGILATIVE HISTORY REsEARCH FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF LAws,
5-6, 33-34 (1972).
11 435 U.S. at 394. The Court quoted and affirmed the Fifth Circuit's statement that a
court's inquiry into the state legislature's intent should be broad, taking into consideration
all possible evidence of legislative intent. 532 F.2d at 435. However, the Court did not indicate
specifically what sources could be appropriate.
435 U.S. at 437.
78 Justice Blackmun did not join in that part of Justice Stewart's dissent which asserts
that the Court's holding will result in questioning and interfering with the substance of state
laws. Id. at 438-40.
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economic experimentation pursuant to its statutory powers because a fed-
eral court might subsequently decide that it was not mandated under the
plurality's test. 19 Rather than risk antitrust liability, a city would be more
likely to refrain from a questionable activity. The result would be to dimin-
ish the role of local government as a proving ground for new ideas.80
Justice Stewart also compared the Court's inquiry into whether state
legislatures contemplate the anticompetitive results of their delegations of
power to the substantive due process analysis rejected in prior decisions
of the Court.81 Deciding whether or not certain results were contemplated
by the legislature was said to amount to challenging the reasonableness of
the legislature's decision to delegate its powers in a particular manner. 2
Although the abandonment of substantive due process inquiries was in-
tended to preclude judicial nullification of statutes which a court finds
unreasonable, Justice Stewart believed application of the plurality's stan-
dards would have the opposite effect of promoting improper judicial legis-
lating.83
While the effect of the decision on the relationship between state and
local governments particularly concerned Justice Stewart, he also empha-
sized the negative impact of the financial burden the decision might place
on municipal antitrust defendants and their residents. The dissent noted
TI 435 U.S. at 439; see text accompanying notes 65-68 supra. According to the dissent,
less local governmental innovation would also result from applying the Chief Justice's test
for a legislative mandate. While the plurality required a legislative mandate for all anticom-
petitive municipal conduct, Chief Justice Burger required a mandate only for proprietary
conduct. Under the Chief Justice's test, a city could not be certain that its actions are not
proprietary and therefore might refrain from the activity. Even if municipal uncertainty
about the nature of the activity did not prevent the city's action, the fact that the Chief
Justice's strict mandate standard (see text accompanying note 36 supra) might have to be
met would likely preclude the city's action.
435 U.S. at 439.
8 Id. at 439-40 & n.28. Fergusen v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) was cited by Justice
Stewart to support the statement that the Court has abandoned the substantive due process
inquiries first undertaken in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner a state
law prohibited the employment of persons in bakeries for more than sixty hours per week or
ten hours per day. Id. at 46 n.1. The Court struck down the statute on the grounds that the
right to contract for services was part of the liberty which could not be denied without due
process of law under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 53. The Court declared that the states
could not go beyond the exercise of their police powers in infringing fourteenth amendment
rights and defined state police powers as promoting the safety, health, morals and general
welfare of the public. Id. The Court held that the New York statute had exceeded these limits.
Id. at 58-59.
In Fergusen, the Court stated the reasons for the subsequent rejection of substantive due
process analysis of state statutes. By applying the fourteenth amendment in this manner to
strike down state statutes, the courts were in effect substituting their value judgments for
those of the state legislatures. The Court has since recognized that states require broad
legislative latitude in order to deal with novel economic and social problems. Consequently,
judicial supervision of state legislative activity has been limited to ensuring that the legisla-
tures are constrained by specific constitutional provisions prohibiting state legislation in
certain areas. 372 U.S. at 730-31; see text accompanying notes 130-31 infra.
" 435 U.S. at 439-40.
0 Id. at 438-39.
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first that treble damages in a suit of City of Lafayette's magnitude, would
result in a decrease in essential public services in order for a defendant city
to avoid bankruptcy.5 The plurality justified the application of antitrust
sanctions to municipalities by pointing out other federal laws which sub-
ject cities, as persons, to civil and criminal liability.16 Justice Brennan,
however, did not decide whether the petitioner cities could be subjected
to treble damage because the district court had not made a finding of the
cities' liability. 7 The majority's failure to address the damages issue was,
according to Justice Stewart, improper since the Clayton Act mandates the
assessment of treble damages against antitrust violators."
Thus, the dissenting Justices' based their disagreement with the hold-
ing on a broad reading of Parker"8 and on the asserted adverse effects of
" As a result of one of the cities' activities, engaging in sham litigation, LP&L claimed
damages of $180 million which, when trebled, amounts to a $540 million claim. Id. at 405,
440, 442 n.1.
Id. at 440-41.
U Id. at 401-02 nn.19-21; see text accompanying note 24 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 23 & 73 supra.
435 U.S. at 440 n.30. Justice Blackmun, in his separate dissenting opinion, also empha-
sized the issue of damages. Id. at 442-43. Focusing on the Court's reliance on other federal
statutes which subject cities to liability as persons, Blackmun pointed out the lenient penal-
ties under those statutes as compared with the treble damages available in antitrust suits.
Id. at 442; see note 24 supra. Since the statutes cited by the Court posed less onerous financial
burdens for defendants than the antitrust laws, Justice Blackmun said that application of
the antitrust sanctions to cities was not automatically justified by municipal liability in other
circumstances. 435 U.S. at 442-43. In view of the potential for municipal insolvency due to
antitrust liability, Blackmun would limit the cities' liability for antitrust violations. Id. at
443. Moreover, he said the Court's refusal to address the issue of damages in City of Lafayette
was improper. Like the other dissenting Justices, Blackmun noted the mandatory nature of
treble antitrust damages. Id. The Court therefore should not have implied a possible excep-
tion for municipal defendants without a full review of the issue. Id.
Treble damages are considered mandatory in order to effectuate the congressional intent
to discourage and punish antitrust violators. See Alaska v. Standard Oil Co. (In re Western
Liquid Asphalt Cases), 487 F.2d 191, 201 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974).
The severity of treble damage liability, however, has been cause for judicial refusal to certify
a lawsuit as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). See Kline v.
Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). Under
Rule 23(b)(3), in order for an action to be maintained as a class action the class action
proceeding must be, among other things, the fairest and most efficient means of adjudication.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). In Kline one factor the court considered on the certification issue
was that if the defendants were found in violation of the Sherman Act their individual shares
of the $750 million claim would be significantly greater than if they were sued individually.
508 F.2d at 234-35. The fact that the Ninth Circuit refused to certify the case, however, does
not support the dissent's contention in City of Lafayette that municipal defendants should
not be subjected to treble damage liability. The court's action in Kline was strongly influ-
enced by the fact that if the defendants were found liable, they could not avoid treble
damages. Id. at 235. Nor does Kline support the proposition, implicitly advanced by Justice
Stewart, that treble damage liability should preclude successful antitrust suits against mu-
nicipalities. 435 U.S. at 440-41. Kline was limited to the question of the propriety of class
actions under the antitrust laws pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and did not
question the propriety of antitrust suits in general. 508 F.2d 226, 235.
" See text accompanying notes 40-43 supra.
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applying the plurality's uncertain analysis to state enabling legislation to
determine whether the activities of local governmental bodies are exempt
from the antitrust laws. On its face, the Parker opinion does not make the
application of the state action doctrine hinge on whether the challenged
activity is governmental or private as the dissent in City of Lafayette
suggests."0 The defendants in Parker were persons whose official- duties
involved the administration of the California Agricultural Prorate Act."
The Court necessarily limited the opinion to the question of the Sherman
Act's applicability to the acts of state government because private parties
or local governmental bodies were not involved in the case.2 Language in
Parker, however, suggests that the Court intended the enunciated exemp-
tion to apply equally to state and local governments. In dictum the Parker
Court stated that if the conduct in question had been undertaken by pri-
vate parties they would have violated the Sherman Act. 3 Arguably, if the
'Court also had not intended to apply the doctrine to local government
activity, it would have been equally explicit. Also, the Court equated states
and municipalities by stating that if either became involved in a private
agreement in restraint of trade an antitrust violation would exist. A logi-
cal inference from this statement is that a municipality should also be
treated like a state when engaged in activity in which no private agreement
is involved, the Sherman Act applying to neither in those circumstances."
The Parker Court also made clear, however, that a state agent's activi-
ties were state action only when directed by the state legislature." The
distinction made by dissenting Justice Stewart in City of Lafayette be-
" See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra.
,3 See note 2 supra.
,2 317 U.S. at 344. The suit involved in Parker was brought against the State Director of
Agriculture, Raisin Proration Zone 1, the State Agricultural Prorate Commission, the Zone 1
Program Commission and others charged by the Agricultural Prorate Act to administer the
Act to enjoin the Act's enforcement. See note 2 supra. The Act also provided that the organi.
zation of a prorate zone was first to be proposed by producers of a commodity. Once the
Prorate Commission approved a program, it had to be submitted to a referendum of the
producers. 317 U.S. at 346-47. The fact that private parties had a part in initiating the
program was not dispositive in Parker because the state, through the Prorate Commission,
had adopted and enforced the programs. See Eastern R. R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135, 140-43 (1961). See also text accompanying note 21 supra.
3 317 U.S. at 350.
,3 Id. at 351-52.
' See 435 U.S. at 429 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In Azzaro v. Town of Branford, 1974-2
Trade Cases 75,337 (1974), a municipality was denied Parker immunity on the theory that
the town had joined private parties in anticompetitive behavior. Id. The court implied,
however, that if no agreements had been made between the town and private parties, but
the town alone had engaged in similarly anticompetitive behavior, a legislative mandate for
the activity would nevertheless have to be shown in order for the town to be afforded state
action immunity. The court in Azzaro, therefore, rejected the implication drawn by Justice
Stewart from Parker in City of Lafayette.
" 317 U.S. at 350-51. What the Parker Court meant by the term "directed" was not
stated in the Parker opinion and was the point of contention between the plurality and
concurring Jostices in City of Lafayette. Compare 435 U.S. at 415 (Brennan, J., plurality
opinion) with 435 U.S. at 425-26 (Burger, C. J., concurring).
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tween nongovernmental and governmental state agents, requiring a legis-
lative mandate only for the anticompetitive practices of nongovernmental
agents, 7 does not logically follow from Parker. Where the Parker Court
required state direction for a state's atent's anticompetitive practices no
exception was made for political subdivisions of the state which are also
state agents. 8
Since the Parker decision did not fully address the applicability of the
state action doctrine to cities, Justice Stewart relied on National League
of Cities v. Usery to support his position that actions taken by a municipal-
ity, like those of a state, should be treated as state action. Examination of
that case shows that the dissent's reliance is unfounded. The Supreme
Court, in National League of Cities, held that Congress could not constitu-
tionally extend certain Fair Labor Standards Act requirements to states
or their municipalities.9 The holding was based on the Court's belief that
Congress, by expanding the Act's coverage, would effectively impair the
states' capacity to function as sovereign governments'8 , by unduly con-
straining their performance of "essential" state functions.10' By extending
minimum wage requirements and overtime standards to states,12 the Act
would increase the states' cost of providing public services. 0 3 A state would
have to choose between imposing higher taxes on its citizens or eliminating
07 See text accompanying notes 11, 60-63 supra.
98 317 U.S. at 350-51. In his concurring opinion, the Chief Justice indicated one reason
why the Parker Court failed to adddress specifically the issues raised in City of Lafayette.
435 U.S. at 420-21. When Parker was decided in 1943, the prevailing view narrowly construed
interstate commerce and limited congressional exercise of the commerce power to the regula-
tion of the purchase and sale of goods between the states and transportation incident to those
transactions. Since production was not considered commerce, a state owning and operating
the means of producing electrical power was not subject to federal control under the com-
merce power. See Slater, supra note 63, at 84-85. Consequently the Court in Parker did not
address the question of the Sherman Act's applicability to states engaged in production. The
defendants in Parker were engaged in regulating the sale and distribution of raisins, the vast
majority of which were sold and shipped in interstate commerce. 317 U.S. at 345.
" 426 U.S. at 855-56 n.20.
110 Id. at 852.
"I, Id. at 839-40.
101 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a)(3) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a)(1)
(1976)) was held to be a valid exercise of the commerce power in United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941). As originally enacted, the Fair Labor Standards Act excluded from
its purview the United States, individual states, and their political subdivisions by stating
that they were not "employers" within the statutory meaning. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1940).
In 1974 Congress amended the Act so that "employers" included public agencies. Act of
April 8, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a)(1), 88 Stat. 58, 64 (1974). Public agencies were
defined as including the United States government and the governments of the states
and their political subdivisions. Id. at § 6(a)(6). Also, Congress added a provision which
stated that employees of a public agency are deemed to be engaged in interstate commerce.
Id. at § 6(a)(5). The result was extension of the Act's requirements to state and local govern-
mental employees.
'1 426 U.S. at 851. The Court held that the magnitude of the cost increases to states
which resulted from the application of the Act to public agencies was not determinitive of
whether the 1974 amendments were constitutional. Id. at 851-52.
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services."0 ' Since municipal power to provide services is derived from the
states,' 5 the Court reasoned that the cities providing public services should
also be protected from federal encroachment.' 6
In National League of Cities the Court protected that aspect of state
sovereignty defined 'as the ability of states and municipalities to perform
essential or integral governmental functions.107 State sovereignty was bal-
anced against federal regulation of interstate commerce through the Fair
Labor Standards Act.' 8 Following the Court's reasoning in National
League of Cities, city government should only be equated with state gov-
ernment"' under the Parker doctrine if providing electric power is an essen-
tial state function and the federal statute undermining that function is an
exercise of the commerce power."10
Providing electric power is not an essential state function which should
override the federal commerce power. Whether activities of the state are
necessary to the state's effective existence in a federal system"' must be
determined on a case by case basis."' In National League of Cities the
Court stated that functions which are integral," 3 traditional,"' essential,"5
and which government is created to provide"' may not be thwarted by the
commerce power. Significantly, the Court specifically affirmed United
States v. California, "I where a state's operation of a railroad was held to
be subject to the commerce power,"' because the activity was not generally
regarded by the states as part of their governmental activities."' The
"I Id. at 848.
g See text accompanying note 9 supra.
426 U.S. at 855-56 & n.20.
Id. at 839, 852; see text accompanying notes 105-106 supra.
IU See text accompanying notes 99-106 supra.
'"See text accompanying notes 105-106 supra.
" In National League of Cities the Court expressly reserved the issues of whether Con-
gress could subvert important state interests through the exercise of its taxing powers or
pursuant to enforcement of the fourteenth amendment. 426 U.S. at 852 n.17. By relying on
New York v. United States, however, the Court did imply that the federal taxing power was
limited to the same extent as the commerce power. See text accompanying note 120 infra.
'M 426 U.S. at 852; cf. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 537-38 n.7 (1975) (applying
the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (1970) to states
because the Act did not exceed the limits of the tenth amendment).
"I Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. at 558 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"1 426 U.S. at 851, 852.
1' Id. at 852.
"' Id. at 839, 845.
' Id. at 851.
-" 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
", Id. at 182-88. Railroads have been regarded as public utilities. See Pulitzer Pub. Co.
v. Federal Commerce Comm'n, 94 F.2d 249, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1937); cf. National Ass'n of
Theater Owners v. Federal Commerce Comm'n, 420 F.2d 194, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970)(including railroads in a list of recognized public utilities).
"1 426 U.S. at 854 n.18. Although the Court in National League of Cities said that
California was based on a finding that the operation of a railroad was not a governmental
activity, the Court did not specifically make such a finding in California. See 297 U.S. at 183-"
84. In California the Court based its decision on the broader theory that Congress' plenary
power to regulate commerce extended to the states in all circumstances. Id. at 185. Neverthe-
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National League of Cities Court also used an analysis employed in deciding
which state instrumentalities are subject to the federal taxing power'52 to
delineate the limits of the commerce power.' 2' By the standard enunciated
in National League of Cities the petitioners in City of Lafayette were not
engaged in an essential state function.'2
Moreover, although the federal interest at issue in City of Lafayette is
more than just a vague economic policy,'1 the Sherman Act, like the Fair
Labor Standards Act, was enacted pursuant to the commerce power.", The
dispositive issue in National League of Cities was which federal powers
could operate to displace state sovereignty.'5 ' Even if the operation of
less, to avoid overruling California in National League of Cities, the Court dismissed the
California Court's interpretation of the commerce clause as dictum, specifically rejected it,
and applied its own narrow interpretation of the clause. 426 U.S. at 854-55.
' Id. at 843. The Court cited New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946) where
congressional power to tax the states was said to be limited only by principles of federalism.
Only state activities and property which were unique from the standpoint of intergovern-
mental relations were said to be immune from federal taxation. Id. at 582 (opinion of Frank-
furter, J.), 588 (Stone, C. J., concurring). The Court held that New York's entrance into the
mineral water market was not a traditional state function deserving immunity from federal
taxation. Id. at 573-74. See also Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 419 (1938) (extending
tax immunity only to functions performed by or for states which are essential to the states'
preservation); Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214, 225 (1934)(upholding federal taxation of
state corporation operating street railroad because the function was not indispensable to the
maintenance of state government).
1 426 U.S. at 843.
l2 See text accompanying notes 113-119 supra. But see 1 E. McQunuAN, supra note 9,
at 95 (municipal provision of utility service is part of a list of essential services which is
expanding as citizens demand that government perform functions formerly undertaken by
individuals for profit or by volunteer groups); Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles:
Permutations of Sovereignty in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L. J. 1165, 1177
(1976)(state functions are essential when the electorate, through the state legislature, has
deemed them important enough to be provided by the state. See note 71 supra).
"I In National League of Cities the Court stated that the Fair Labor Standards Act's
minimum wage requirements were a matter of economic policy and its overtime requirements
an effort by Congress to spread employment. 426 U.S. at 848-49. In contrast, the maintenance
of a competitive market system to which federal antitrust laws are directed has long been
considered by the Court one of the more important national interests protected by federal
legislation. See e.g., United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972), Apex Hosiery
v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 490-501 (1940). The federal interest embodied in the Sherman Act
was duly recognized by both the majority and dissent in City of Lafayette. See 435 U.S. at
398, 428 n.2.
,24 See text accompanying note 52 supra.
12 426 U.S. at 852. But see id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In National League of
Cities Justice Blackmun understood the Court to adopt a test which determines whether
Congress can undermine state sovereignty by regulating essential state functions through the
commerce power by balancing the importance of the federal policy pursued by the commerce
power against state sovereignty. According to Blackmun, National League of Cities would not
prevent Congress from regulating essential state functions when the impetus for exercising
the commerce power is a more compelling federal interest than the vague economic policies
pursued by the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. Under Blackmun's analysis, National League
of Cities does not prevent the Sherman Act from applying to state or municipal power
companies even if providing electrical power is an essential state function. The federal inter-
est in maintaining a free market economy is more important than the policies underlying the
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public utilities was an essential state function, which it is not,",6 there
would be no reason to allow the Sherman Act to constrain municipal opera-
tion of a power company when the Fair Labor Standards Act cannot. The.
City of Lafayette dissent's analogy to National League of Cities breaks
down only because of the dissimilar state functions involved in each case.'2
Although neither the Parker decision nor National League of Cities
supports the position that state action immunity should automatically
extend to cities, Justice Stewart believed that the adverse effects of requir-
ing cities to show a legislative mandate for their activities were great
enough to justify the broader application of the Parker doctrine. The re-
quirement of a legislative mandate for municipal activities may lead to
disruption of the relationships between state and city governments. The
need for broad delegations of authority to municipalities has increased
with the degree of congestion in urban communities and the range of prob-
lems peculiar to particular localities. 1' To deal effectively with unique
problems, 29 local governments have assumed a more active role in areas
previously reserved to state government or private enterprise. Municipal
ownership of utilities has been recognized as being especially responsive to
the need for local authority to address purely local matters. 30 Justice Stew-
art correctly points out that the plurality's nebulous standard for a legisla-
tive mandate of municipal activities 3' makes more specific delegations of
power to local governments the only safe way to assure municipal antitrust
immunity. State legislatures are thus put in the position of anticipating
Fair Labor Standards Act. See text accompanying note 123 supra.
Justice Blackmun's analysis in National League of Cities finds credence in Justice
Rehnquist's opinion. The Court specifically affirmed its decision in Fry v. United States, 421
U.S. 542 (1975). In Fry, the Court upheld the extension of the Economic Stabilization Act of
1970 requirements to states. See note 111 supra. Significantly, the Court noted that the Act
was an emergency measure and that any resultant infringement of state sovereignty was
therefore justified. 421 U.S. at 538. To distinguish Fry in National League of Cities Justice
Rehnquist also emphasized the overriding importance of the Economic Stabilization Act to
the economic well being of the nation. 426 U.S. at 853.
£12 See text accompanying notes 111-122 supra.
'2 See text accompanying notes 109-10 supra; but see text accompanying note 125 supra.
I 1 E. McQumLAN, supra note 9, at 140.
' Id. at 95. The potential for municipal autonomy is greatest in states which have
adopted home rule constitutional or statutory provisions. See Vanlandingham, Municipal
Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY L. Rnv. 269 (1968). Under these provisions,
cities are free to adopt charters or statutes through which purely local matters are dealt with
by local government. Id. at 279-80. Home rule provisions are thus responsive to the same
concerns which have resulted in broader delegations of government authority to municipali-
ties. Id. at 270; see note 121 supra.
"I See 2 E. McQUILLAN, supra note 9, at 243-45. Municipal operation of public utilities
should not be subject to state legislative controls beyond the service and rate scales for the
utilities. Id. at 243. The operation of the utility is primarily, although not exclusively, a
proprietary function, that is, for the benefit of local, as opposed to state interests. Id. at 243-
45. That is not to say, however, that municipal operation is a private activity, as Chief Justice
Burger suggests in City of Lafayette. See note 36 supra. McQuillan distinguishes between a
city in its proprietary capacity and private ownership as mutually exclusive categories. 2 E.
McQuiLAN, supra note 9, at 243-44.
"I See text accompanying notes 29-36 supra.
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the needs of each locality while the difficulty of anticipating local needs
has been the impetus for increasingly broad delegations of governmental
authority.
While the court's decision in City of Lafayette will have some effect on
the manner in which states delegate power to localities, no support exists
for Justice Stewart's contention that the substance of state legislation also
will be subject to federal interference.'32 Requiring a state mandate for
municipal anticompetitive activity will not prevent social and economic
innovation by cities. By exposing municipalities to potential antitrust lia-
bility the Court seeks to influence states to consider the economic effects
of their decisions to mandate anticompetitive conduct. Innovation will be
curtailed only when the anticompetitive results of an activity outweigh its
benefits. Where a state determines otherwise, nothing in the Court's opin-
ions prevents a state from delegating to a city the power to act. Nor does
the plurality opinion, contary to Justice Stewart's contentions, envision
substantive due process inquiries into the reasonableness of state legisla-
tive enactments. Rather than questioning the wisdom of a state's decision
to delegate anticompetive authority, the plurality's test is aimed only at
ascertaining whether the authority was in fact delegated to a city claiming
Parker immunity.'
The dissenters contended that, in addition to the disruption of state
and local governmental relations, the subjection of cities to treble damage
liability justifies extending antitrust immunity to municipalities. 1' Justice
Stewart offered no basis for his statement beyond the financial hardships
such liability would bring to local taxpayers.135 Antitrust immunity, how-
ever, is not necessarily the proper way to avoid municipal treble damage
liability. A persuasive argument can be made that Congress should reas-
sess its prior reluctance to amend the Clayton Act by removing treble
damage liability in certain cases.'36 Since the Congresses which enacted the
Sherman Act and later provided for treble damages under the Clayton Act
probably did not consider the effect of the Acts on local governments, 7 the
132 See text accompanying notes 78-82 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 29-36 supra. Although the plurality in City of Lafayette
does not adopt an analysis similar to due process inquiries, the Chief Justice's concurring
opinion does. Chief Justice Burger first required state compulsion of municipal anticompeti-
tive proprietary activity. 435 U.S. at 425 n.6. Before extending state action immunity to a
state's political subdivisions, however, the Chief Justice thought that a court should find that
the compelled activity was no more anticompetitive than was necessary to effectuate the
state's objectives in delegating its authority. Id. at 426. In other words, the Chief Justice
would have the Court substitute its judgment for the state's on the question of how a state
policy, which does not violate a specific constitutional provision, is to be implemented. This
manner of judicial review is precisely that which the Court has abandoned. $ee text accompa-
nying note 81 supra. Nevertheless, Justice Marshall, in a brief concurrence, agreed with the
Chief Justice's analysis. 435 U.S. at 417.
,34 See text accompanying notes 84-88 supra.
"1 435 U.S. at 440.
131 Justice Blackmun, in his dissenting opinion, noted several occasions when Congress
has refused to make treble damages in antitrust suits discretionary. 435 U.S. at 443 n.2.
' See note 98 supra.
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unusually high cost of treble liability should not be imposed on taxpayers
unless Congress specifically addresses the issue of damages in cases of
governmental liability. Until the Clayton Act is amended, however, the
severity of antitrust penalties alone should not serve to create antitrust
immunity.
City of Lafayette, despite its narrow holding,'38 reaffirms the require-
ment of a legislative mandate as a prerequisite for application of the
Parker doctrine to antitrust defendants other than a state. The Court did
not agree on what standard a mandate must meet in cases challenging the
conduct of a state's political subdivision. The vague standards advanced
by the plurality and concurring Justices are the decision's weakest points.
Whether the legislative mandate requirement is justified is a question for
which neither the Parker decision nor National League of Cities provides
a definite answer. The significant point made by the dissent, however, is
that without a clear statement of what standard the mandate must meet,
state legislatures will be forced to delegate governmental power in more
specific terms in order to avoid potential judicial findings of insufficient
state direction. The potential result is to make procedurally more difficult
a state's delegation of power to local government for the solution of purely
local problems. However, the states' capacity to decide which problems are
to be addressed locally, and which powers the states will delegate to locali-
ties for that purpose will not be adversely affected.
JoHN J. EKLUND
Im See text accompanying note 18 supra. See generally Carrell, Annual Survey of Anti-
trust Developments, 1977-1978, 36 WASH. & LEE L. Rv. 1, 9-17 (1979).
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